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The European Union's Normative Power: Critical Perspectives and Perspectives on the Critical Ian Manners * In spring 1994 I first heard Richard Whitman ask the question, 'what is the international identity of the European Union?'. The end of the Cold War, the Treaty on European Union, and wars in Kuwait and the Former Yugoslavia all raised methodological, theoretical and empirical questions over the study of the European Union's (EU) 'international identity' (Whitman 1994 (Whitman , 1996 (Whitman , 1998 Manners and Whitman 1998, 2003) . In the 1990s and early 2000s I worked on projects studying the EU's international identity, the foreign policies of EU member states, and the interplay between 'English School' international theory and European integration during the 1990s with Whitman and latterly Diez (see Manners During this period it became increasingly clear to me that the study of the EU in world politics needed to engage with both critical social theory and normative international theory. My work on symbolism in European integration during the early 1990s suggested that EU studies needed to engage with social theories that took physical, performative and discursive symbolism seriously (Manners 2000b (Manners , 2005 (Manners , 2010b . Here the work of Berger and Luckmann, Cohen, Searle and Calhoun is important in coming to terms with both social construction and critical social theory (see, for example, Cohen 1985; Calhoun 1995; Searle 1995; Berger and Luckmann 1996). At the same time, sharing an intellectual milieu with international political theorists such as Devetak, Cochran, Mandaville, Frost and Kinnvall suggested that EU studies also needed to engage with normative theories that took international, supranational and transnational politics seriously (see Kinnvall 1995 Kinnvall , 2006 Frost 1996; Cochran 1999; Devetak 1999; Mandaville 2001) .
Critical theory seeks to provide a 'critical theory of society as it is, a theory dominated at every turn by a concern for reasonable conditions of life' (Horkheimer 1972: 198-9) . Critical theory is 'critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how
Three meanings of normative power
The infusion of critical social theory and normative international theory into discussions of the post-Cold War world led to a project to interrogate the EU's international identity through the deployment of critical and normative theory, concepts and methods. The initial plan was to complete a book-length project reflecting on developments throughout the 1990s but MAC/NORM Page-228 9780230_577640_13_cha12
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228 Future Orientations the nature of the academic 'profession' being what it is, an article was first to emerge followed by a further decade of research and reflection (Manners 2000a (Manners , 2002 (Manners , 2004 . The 2002 article in the Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS) (see Appendix) had the merit of being quickly published and having an immediate impact, but the drawback of compounding three differing meanings of normative power, as well as only briefly including one out of nine case studies. The three meanings of normative power come from the crucial analytical issues of theory, concepts and methods in the social sciences.
Normative theory
The first meaning of normative power is the emphasis on normative theory, that is, how we judge and justify truth claims in social science. Normative theory is commonly believed to lie in opposition to empirical experience or positive description but following Cochran, the justification of the selection of empirical data, the value given to a particular interpretation of data and the claims regarding why such research should be judged important all involve normative truth claims (see The contributions to this volume reflect normative theory in a variety of ways, ranging from political theory and international theory to neoGramscian theory and post-structural theory. In addition, the contributions tend to take quite different approaches to the study of the norms at work in EU external actions, reflecting a variety of understandings of social theory. The original 2000 Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) working paper drew on four different social theories in its typology of international norms: positivism and the role of 'utilitarian norms'; interpretivism and the role of 'social norms'; critical theory and the role of 'moral norms'; and postmodern science and the role of 'narrative norms'. 1 In the paper this typology was applied to the case study of the EU's pursuit of the international norm of death penalty moratoria and abolition in order to illustrate the way in which different understandings of social theory shape the evaluation of EU external actions (Manners 2000a: 42-3).
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This variety of normative theory and social theory can be seen throughout the various chapters in the volume, as five examples illustrate. Bickerton contrasts two different normative theories, cosmopolitan law and communitarian social preferences, in the study of political legitimacy. Bickerton's discussion of cosmopolitan law draws on a Habermasian framework of three sources of legitimacy: pragmatic justification related to 'utilitarian norms'; ethical-pragmatic justification related to 'social norms'; and moral justification related to 'moral norms'. In contrast, his discussion of communitarian social preferences focuses on a means of combining theories of 'social norms' with those of 'utilitarian norms' found in 'interests'. Smith explores and juxtaposes the EU as a post-sovereign 'normative power' and the United States (US) as a sovereign 'goliath' in terms of international theory in his study of global public goods. Smith suggests a number of implications of the juxtaposition, including the social role of 'self-perception'; the Gramscian perspective on hegemony; and a more utilitarian suggestion for the investigation of the provision of global public goods.
Haukkala examines the question of EU regional role in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) using Gramsci's notion of hegemony and focusing on the Ukraine. Haukkala argues that while attempting to deploy utilitarian and social norms, its current inability to grant membership is a problematic. Diez and Pace's study of EU conflict transformation identifies with a 'Foucauldian understanding of power' involving the study of the discursive construction of the EU. They focus on the notion of the 'power of reputation' and the way in which the 'discursive acceptance' of EU reputation is shared with conflict parties. Diez and Pace place their emphasis on the role of 'narrative norms' and the impact that a discourse of EU normative power has in conflict situations. Juncos uses a combination of normative theories to study EU discourses and practices in Bosnia, drawing on Diez's discursive approach; Merlingen and Ostraiskaite's (2006) use of Foucauldian 'governmentality'; hegemonic understandings of neoliberal ideology; as well as Barnett and Duvall's (2005a) constructivist approach to power as a product of social relations.
As all the chapters illustrate, engaging with normative power ensures, first and foremost, that the analyst needs to think about their understanding of normative theory, regardless of whether it is more empiricist or more critical in orientation. In this respect, as Orbie clearly states, the normative power 'idea forces us to consider questions that, while most difficult to answer, are very much worth raising'. This grounding in normative theory provides the foundation for the next two meanings of normative power -the concept of normative power as form of power and the characterisation of a type of actor (see 
Normative form of power
The second meaning of normative power is as a form of power that is ideational rather than material or physical. As a normative form of power, the emphasis is on the ability to use normative justification rather than an ability to use material incentives or physical force (see discussion of the normative form of power in Manners 2009a Manners , 2009b Manners , 2010a . In this respect, relations and policies with the rest of the world should be 'normatively sustainable' -that is, 'normatively' explicable and justifiable to others; 'sustainable' into the next generation. But this ability or form of power should also be understood as a conception of social power where 'power to is prior to power over', in contrast to most traditional political theory (Barnes 1993: 208) . The contributions to this volume understand normative forms of power in differing ways, stretching from the analysis of norm promotion, including development assistance and trade relations, as well as strategic narratives and military force. Thus the chapters analyse the interplay between normative justification, material incentives and physical force, as five examples illustrate. Birchfield approaches the study of EU development assistance using normative power as 'theoretically grounded, empirical framework of analysis' concluding that, with the exception of two areas, the policies 'represent the normative form and the empirical function on the concept as well as the praxis of normative power'. Birchfield explores how material development assistance is related to processes of internal and external normative justification, suggesting that 'the EU seemingly undergoes an exercise in what Martin describes as an identification and legitimation internal process coupled with an external process of justification and projection'. Martin argues that a human security approach could provide a strategic narrative for the EU in order to bridge 'the apparent divide between an emphasis on norms and a readiness to use coercive force. Such a narrative could also provide a more nuanced explanation and justification for how these two types of instrument can and should be combined.' Martin's analysis examines the interplay between normative justification and physical force as part of developing a human security, with a case study of the EU's engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
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Stewart and Björkdahl both analyse the ways in which normative justification (conflict resolution and peace support operations), material incentives (accession and economic agreements) and physical force (military force and coercive capacity) are deeply interdependent in the EU's 'neighbourhood'. Stewart focuses on EU actions in the South Caucasus, in particular on the promotion of 'constitutional norms and norms pertaining to the peaceful settlement of disputes'. She argues that 'the incentives for reform are lacking without the offer of accession' and concludes that 'a more reflective consideration of the nature of EU power in the neighbourhood' should be based on 'external empowerment, not coercion'. While Björkdahl examines EU experiences in the Western Balkans, she also looks further afield to peace support operations in the DRC and Sudan. She puts forward the argument that the EU 'can be both normative and powerful but needs to couple its traditional normative powers with its newly developed military capacity'. Orbie looks at the interaction of normative justification and material incentives with an emphasis on the 'promotion of social solidarity through European trade policies'. He suggests that the EU has relied almost exclusively on persuasion and incentives in the shape of positive conditionality rather than trade sanctions.
All the chapters illustrate the ability to use a normative form of power, in the shape of normative justification, has to constantly come to terms with the intersection and interaction of others forms of power (material incentives or physical force). In all the chapters, whether focused on norm promotion, trade practices or peacekeeping missions, this dilemma of combining normative power with material or physical forms of power arises. My emphasis on normative forms of power assumes that the prioritising of normative power may help ensure that any subsequent or parallel use of material incentives and/or physical force is thought about and utilised in a more justifiable way. The foundation in normative theory and emphasis on a normative form of power provides the basis for the third meaning of normative power -the characterisation of a type of actor. Forsberg (2009: 10) has usefully drawn on Raymond Aron to distinguish between these two meanings of power -pouvoir as the 'ability to cause effects' and puissance as 'a powerful actor' (see Aron 1986). Such a distinction between 'une nouvelle forme de pouvoir normatif ' (a new form of power) and 'une grande puissance régionale' (a type of regional great power) facilitates a discussion of a normative type of actor (see distinction between 'pouvoir normatif ' and 'puissance régionale' in Manners 2006b: 48).
Normative type of actor
The third meaning of normative power is as a characterisation of a type of actor and its international identity. Rather than an emphasis on the ability to use normative justification (pouvoir), the weight here is placed on the extent to which any actor in world politics is on a 'normative heading' As would be expected from the reflective contributions to this volume, none of the chapters make absolutist claims about whether the EU is or is not a normative type of actor. All the chapters make more qualified observations regarding the character of the EU as a type of actor in world politics. For Bickerton the EU's 'quintessentially "post-national" legitimacy claim' is a part of its 'autonomy from the traditional political orders of nation-states'. Haukkala sets out how the 'character of the EU as an actor' includes almost a monopoly on 'its most essential characteristic, European-ness'. Stewart establishes the 'key EU internal characteristics' as based on democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedom, although she also observes how the 'EU is reluctant to tout itself as an actor in mediation, preferring a softer approach'. Juncos proposes that 'the EU's role in Bosnia since the 1990s could indeed be characterised as one of normative power', however in the case of Bosnia this characterisation has been undermined by inconsistencies and double standards. Björkdahl explores normative power from an identity perspective 'as describing a particular type of actor', insightfully recognising that 'the normative power concept also connotes the characteristic of the EU as an actor'.
Smith presents the EU as an 'ideal type' involving 'certain characteristics in its assumptions and behaviour . . . based on international governance, comprehensive security and commercial exchange/interdependence', but concludes that such an ideal type needs qualifying with empirical work. Birchfield advocates comparing the EU as a normative type of actor with 'various other characterisations of the EU's power and role as a global actor' in order to interpret 'the institutional and ideational character of the EU'. Orbie suggests that 'the constitutive principles which characterise the EU as a normative power are also, and increasingly, present in its trade policies'. Martin argues, following Javier Solana, that the EU adopt a human security approach 'reflecting its distinctive character as a polity committed to
foundational ideas of peace, democracy and human rights rather than the classic nation-state defence of territory'. Lastly, Diez and Pace seek to move beyond the question of 'whether the characterisation of the EU as a normative power' is empirically verifiable to argue that 'the far more interesting question . . . is to what extent the EU is constructed as a normative power'. All the chapters illustrate the extent to which characterising the EU as a normative type of actor raises many methodological challenges. Clearly such a question is not one that can be answered without attempting to define and delimit a working understanding of what an 'ideal type' normative actor would be. Secondly, the chapters all sensibility focus on just one aspect of EU external actions, ranging from near relations to trade and development to security and conflict issues. Attempting to judge whether the EU can be characterised as a more normative type of actor would clearly be beyond the possibility of any one chapter, perhaps even book, given the wide range of principles which the EU appears to advocate (see next section). Thirdly, any such judgement of the EU as a normative type of actor would need to have a critical understanding of the differences between causal and constitutive analysis of EU external actions, as well as deploying a long-term analytical time frame capable of studying norm shifts rather than momentary fluctuations. 3 Finally, it may also be the case, as Diez and Pace suggest, that trying to definitively settle the question of whether or not the EU is a normative type of actor is really missing the point. If the notion of normative power is genuinely situated in critical social theory, then its purpose would not just be to analyse and reproduce traditional power structures as a form of problemsolving theory -its purpose would be to change existing structures of power and injustice by opening up the possibilities of different perspectives. 4 One way of doing this is, as Birchfield and Orbie do, to deploy a tripartite analytical framework for understanding the principles, actions and impact of actors such as the EU in world politics ( 
Principles in normative power
The first part of any normative power analysis is to examine the principles at work in the understanding of a normative form of power. As Bickerton convincingly set out in his chapter, normative power should primarily be seen as legitimate in the principles being promoted. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the principles being promoted must be seen as legitimate, as well as being promoted in a coherent and consistent way (on coherence and consistency, see European Commission 2006b; Portela and Raube 2009). Legitimacy of principles in world politics may come from previously established international conventions, treaties or agreements, particularly if these are important within the United Nations (UN) system. Coherence of principles comes from the extent to which MAC/NORM Page-234 9780230_577640_13_cha12
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234 Future Orientations differing principles, and practices to promote them, can be seen to be sound and non-contradictory. Consistency of principles comes from the extent to which differing principles, and practices to promote them, are uniform both within and without the promoting entity, and are applied uniformly. Principles in the EU and its relations with the rest of the world draw upon the principles of the UN Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN Covenants, and the Council of Europe/European Convention on Human Rights. In practical terms such principles can be differentiated into the prime principle of sustainable peace; core principles of freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law (as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, after the Lisbon Treaty); as well as the objectives and tasks of equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance (as set out in Articles 2 and 21 of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 8-11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, after the Lisbon Treaty). Coherence and consistency in the international promotion of these principles is intended to come from the role of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, set out in the Lisbon Treaty.
All the chapters in this volume illustrate the role of principles in EU external actions. Bickerton's study of legitimacy contrasts cosmopolitan legal principles with communitarian social preferences based on principles of equality, institutionalisation and general applicability that emanate from the EU's political experience. 5 Haukkala identifies the way that membership of the EU based on respecting founding values and principles was seen as legitimate across Europe as long as enlargement was geographically open ended. Stewart's consideration of the three South Caucasus ENP action plans emphasises the prominence given to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as the importance of compliance with European and international norms and principles. Juncos pays particular attention to the principle of local ownership in Bosnia, but is critical of the roles of the EU Special Representative/High Representative for imposing reforms over Bosnia's democratic institutions. Björkdahl's analysis of EU peace support operations pays particular attention to the principle of 'living by example' (including respect for the principles of the UN Charter) by focusing on the 'prime EU normative principle' of sustainable peace.
Smith looks at the principle vision or idea of EU normative power to argue for three core elements: secular, critical, self-reflexivity; non-coercive; and post-sovereign. Birchfield's examination of EU development policy identifies the 'key principles' as equality and solidarity, although she also identifies the way the EU's new (2005) development policy concepts of harmonisation, results-orientation, ownership and coherence align EU principles with those of the UN. Orbie's work on trade relations suggests that 'the EU's foreign policy principles of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights
Ian Manners 235 and fundamental freedoms' also apply to trade policies. Martin's advocacy of human security principles has much in common with EU principles such as the need for legitimacy, human rights, effective multilateralism found in good global governance, a bottom-up approach to ownership and the need for prioritisation of normative justifications over physical force. Lastly, Diez and Pace study the impact of the EU's self-representation as a normative power on conflict transformation in the context of the principle of lasting or sustainable peace.
Almost all the chapters address the challenges of legitimacy for the principles promoted through normative power, in particular with reference to questions of coherence and consistency. Bickerton focuses on the question of the search for legitimacy in the promotion of principles, concluding that 'the primary obstacle to the legitimacy of the EU as a normative power thus lies precisely in the lack of political development which scholars pointed to in the first place as the reason for the EU's predisposition to act normatively'. Similarly Haukkala also focuses on the challenge of legitimacy, concluding that 'at least in its present form the Neighbourhood Policy is far from a panacea. It suffers from a lack of legitimacy as a result of its inability to answer the neighbours' calls for full political and institutional belonging in Europe.' In arguing for a human security narrative, Martin suggests that it provides 'symbolic resonance though identification and legitimation' while addressing 'issues of consistency, coherence and effectiveness'.
Actions of normative power
Normative power should secondly be perceived as persuasive in the actions taken to promote such principles. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the actions taken must involve persuasion, argumentation, and the conferral of prestige or shame. As Keene (2008: 3) has argued, 'normative power could be understood as moral, political or social: as a function of virtue, persuasion or prestige'. Persuasion in the promotion of principles in world politics involves constructive engagement, the institutionalisation of relations, and the encouragement of multilateral and plurilateral dialogue between participants. Within these international and domestic venues for dialogue, debate and argumentation can involve reference to international principles as well as encouraging understanding and agreement (although also misunderstanding and disagreement). Similarly, such engagement and debate can also involve the conferral of prestige or shame by participants. The attribution of prestige may range from public declarations of support to membership of an international community, while the attribution of shame may involve public condemnation or the use of symbolic sanctioning.
EU actions in the promotion of principles cover a full spectrum of practices and policies, encouraging a more holistic, or comprehensive approach MAC/NORM Page-236 9780230_577640_13_cha12
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236 Future Orientations to the many challenges of world politics. The EU has historically been better at addressing more structural challenges through development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue and enlargement. In the past decade the gradual evolution of conflict prevention and crisis management policies has helped improve EU ability to deal with more immediate challenges, such as humanitarian crises and post-conflict reconstruction. This combination of EU actions marks a first step towards a more sustainable peace strategy where the EU is able to address both the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict. However, the EU approach to the promotion of principles does not emphasise structural capacity or crisis ability, but focuses on the encouragement of processes of engagement and dialogue. Such EU engagement entails initiating and institutionalising regular patterns of communication or partnership, for example, through accession procedures, stabilisation and/or association agreements, the ENP, African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) relations, and Strategic Partnerships. All the chapters also illustrate the types of actions taken to promote principles in EU external actions. Bickerton contrasts Eriksen's (2006: 265) cosmopolitan discussion of how EU 'enforcement mechanisms -namely capacity to make threats credible -can rightly do so only in so far as its actions are democratically regulated' with Laïdi's (2005: 265) communitarian discussion of normative power as 'disciplining the game of its [global] actors, introducing predictability in their actions'. Haukkala suggests that 'to argue that the Union's normative power is dependent on the perceived legitimacy of its actions and policies in the eyes of its partners is hardly a groundbreaking finding'. He argues instead that 'it is worth emphasising that at least in Europe the EU has an additional structural constraint [that] . . . the Union is not a state actor . . . but is a regional integration process to which the "objects" of that power can, and often do, aspire to join before accepting its norms and values as entirely legitimate'. Stewart sets out how struggles with institutional reform (leading to the Lisbon Treaty) during 2002-09 had impacted 'negatively on the EU's ability to formulate and implement coherent external action', although she also identifies how EU preference for normative mediation and persuasion 'gives the impression that the EU's enthusiasm for confidence-building is an easy substitute for more robust action'. Juncos follows Stewart in suggesting that 'consistency problems . . . affect EU external action more generally ("double standards" and consistency among EU actors and policies)', both also emphasise how 'the deployment of both civilian and military instruments in Bosnia's constitution an example of this civ-mil power in action'. Björkdahl places considerable emphasis on the way 'ESDP peace support actions in the field need to translate the declaratory politics of the EU into action' where 'military forces and individual peacekeepers' actions are guided by and in compliance with the norms championed by the EU'.
Smith differentiates between tangible resources (in material form) and 'less tangible resources in the form of commitment to agreed courses of MAC Many of the chapters look at deliberative practices, persuasive actions, as well as symbolic rewards and sanctions in the promotion of principles. Smith and Orbie both emphasise the 'deliberative nature' and 'deliberative approach' in EU foreign policy and external actions. Diez and Pace clarify that 'in contrast to earlier conceptualisations of EU civilian power, it is not even economic means that are at the core of EU power. Instead, power becomes an effect of norm leadership and persuasion.' Similarly, quoting Pascal Lamy, Orbie emphasises EU GSP-plus (Generalised System of Preferences) trade policy as 'built around persuasion and incentives rather than threats and demands'. However, Björkdahl argues that 'increasingly, the Union demonstrates a readiness to extent traditional, soft foreign policy methods such as persuasion, offering and granting wards, and norm diffusion to also include hard powers, such as military coercion, the threat of punishment as well as deployment of military force in its efforts to contribute to international peace and security'. A third perspective is provided by Juncos, who argues that 'the power of the EU in the Balkans has not relied on persuasion (and the power of norms), but mainly on coercion'. For Stewart it is not norm leadership, persuasion or coercion that is the problem in the South Caucasus, but 'indecision and division among the EU member states will not persuade the de facto [breakaway] states to turn away from Russia and towards the EU'.
Impact of normative power
Normative power should ultimately be envisaged as socialising in the impact of the actions taken to promote such principles. If normative justification is MAC/NORM Page-238 9780230_577640_13_cha12
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238 Future Orientations to be convincing or attractive, then its impact must involve socialisation, partnership and ownership. Socialisation as an impact of the promotion of principles in world politics should be seen as being part of an open-ended process of engagement, debate and understanding. Partnership as an impact of the promotion of principles may be the result of institutionalised relationships created by the participating parties whether multilateral or plurilateral, international or transnational. Ownership as an impact of the promotion of principles involves practices of joint or local ownership as a result of partner involvement and consultation. However, such impacts of normative power should be based on the recognition that while international diplomatic socialisation is largely a mirage, the nurturing of domestic, transnational and international support for international principles can be helped by the three-part processes of normative justification conceived here. EU impact in promoting principles can be extraordinarily difficult to judge. One way of making this judgement might be on the basis of empirical evidence, as Patton (2009) has done in her path-breaking study of EU neighbourhood and energy policies using data from a wide range of independent non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 6 Another way is to analyse the impact of the construction of the EU as a normative power, as Diez Beyond these practices, clarity of principle is important in ensuring others understand what the EU is trying to promote, as with the idea of 'never again' in the post-Yugoslav space. Simplicity of action space is important when the EU, albeit very rarely, is the only or predominant actor, as with the pre-accession processes of the 1990s. Consistency of promotion is crucial to ensure the EU avoids claims of 'double standards', as is often the case in state recognition (such as Kosovo) or UN resolutions (such as the Middle East). Holistic, 'joined-up' thinking is important in the broader promotion of principles through the multilateral system, such as the many challenges of the Doha Round of trade liberalisation, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and addressing climate change at the Copenhagen CoP15. Partnership, not EU unilateralism is important for building global consensus and ensuring success in multilateral institutions. Finally, timescale is important when attempting to judge EU principles, actions and impact in any normatively sustainable way.
As would be expected, given their differing empirical foci, the chapters also illustrate the varying impact of EU actions taken to promote principles. Bickerton emphasises a very broad interpretation of the EU's transformative impact on the 'global community' and 'the very dynamics of international politics', in many ways capturing the discourses of 'international society' and 'world society' within the 'English School' of international . Haukkala concludes on an equally broad observation regarding the limits of EU enlargement and 'the question of how to alleviate the negative impact of relinquishing the most effective foreign policy tool at the EU's disposal'. Stewart places considerable importance on analysing impact and outcome, concluding that 'the EU acts normatively in its relations with the South Caucasus, but has a limited normative impact with regard to constitutional norms and norms pertaining to the peaceful settlement of disputes'. Juncos also emphasises the studying external impact, focusing on the importance of economic assistance, visa access to EU labour markets, the EU police mission and the role of the EU Special/High Representative, including suggesting that 'if the EU really wants to have an impact in Bosnia' it should be talking about visas not crime. Björkdahl identifies increasing tensions between power and legitimacy; between internal developments and external impact; and between norms and actions. Smith identifies a relationship between 'the impact rather than the conception of policies that are produced through normative power' and the 'qualities of international governance, a non-coercive order and the commercialisation of international order' in EU external impact. Birchfield explicitly applies the normative power tripartite analytical framework to conclude that 'overall the bulk of the empirical evidence suggests a tentative affirmation of the congruence between the notion of the EU as a normative power and the reorientation and execution of its development policies'. Orbie concludes that 'the Union's principles, and to some extent also its activities, do indeed increasingly correspond with what would be expected from a normative power, but that its normative impact remains unclear'. Martin raises the critical issue that 'there is no consistent evaluation methodology of external action, nor any reliable assessment of how action impacts upon third countries'. Finally, Diez and Pace directly address the 'impact of the EU's self-representation on conflict transformation', gauging that the impact is mixed in Cyprus and negative in Palestine.
A number of the chapters discuss socialisation, partnership and ownership in the context of the impact of EU actions taken to promote principles. Juncos places considerable emphasis on the importance of promoting local ownership in Bosnia, arguing that 'a real partnership and a dialogue among equals has not yet materialised' (presumably because of concerns for the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina). However, she does suggest that while 'Bosnia has made progress in terms of democratisation and human rights', it is 'not clear to what extent Bosnian elites have internalised EU norms as socialisation channels are limited'. Birchfield also discussed the question of ownership as a 'fundamental concept' of new EU development policy, concluding that 'the EU sees ownership by EU partner countries as pivotal for the efficiency and sustainability of its initiatives'. Stewart, drawing 
Conclusion: perspectives on the critical
The deployment of a tripartite analytical framework for understanding the principles, actions and impact of the EU, at least as found in the contributing chapters, helps illustrate how analysing different forms of power might contribute to studying the EU as a type of actor. But the chapters also raised critical questions about how we analyse and understand both the EU's form of normative power and the EU as a normative power, in the context of normative theory. Such critical questioning is part of critical social theory's commitment to contextual, opening and changing and will be addressed in this concluding section of perspectives on the critical. In order to conclude with perspectives on the critical questions raised in the book, I will begin by using the framework provided by Hay's (2002) critical introduction to political analysis. Hay (2002: 63) set out how the philosophy of social science has a directional dependence where 'ontology logically precedes epistemology which logically precedes methodology'. Hay (2002: 63) summarises that 'ontology relates to the nature of the social and political world, epistemology to what we can know about it and methodology to how we might go about acquiring that knowledge'. The contributions to this book, and much wider engagements with beliefs about 'normative power', all open up for ontological, epistemological and methodological perspectives.
7
The ontology of shared union For Hay (2002: 61-2), the question of the 'political' is an ontological issue in political analysis -'what is the nature of the social and political reality being investigated?'. As a first step in the analytical process, there is a need to clarify just how can we understand the EU in world politics? Bickerton places this question at the centre of his study of legitimacy, contrasting the 'traditional political order of nation-states' with the 'lack of a unified political order' in the EU. Here there is a potential risk of a return to the 'supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy' between an emphasis on the construction of the EU as a type of supranational 'state' and as a type of intergovernmental 'regime of states' that so debilitated EU studies during the twentieth century (see discussion in Manners and As an actor consisting of other actors (such as member states, transnational political parties and transnational interest groups) the EU is constituted both through its interactions with these 'internal' groups and with other global actors. In this respect the EU is not so analytically dissimilar to other global actors, for example, as states consisting of other actors (such as local-regional authorities, political parties and interest groups) that are constituted both through their interactions with these 'internal' groups and with other global actors. All of these relationships between the structures of international society, the structures of the international society of the EU, the structures of states and the agencies of interest groups, parties, local-regional authorities, member states and the EU all constitute the EU in world politics. These are dynamic social and political relationships that are evolving historically, politically and legally, thus necessitating an understanding of the EU's reality located in a social ontology. 8 All of these questions of polycentricity, hybridity, interaction, constitution, structure and agency, and social ontology are implicit in the normative power approach, as would be expected of any critical social theory. Epistemologically (and ontologically) all the chapters stand in opposition to more problematic attempts to separate interests and norms in the study of politics. In this respect interests and norms of normative power are two sides of the same coin, whether that coinage is labelled 'bounded rationality', 'social preferences', 'cultural hegemony' or 'discursive construction' (see Manners 2000a Manners , 2004 Manners , 2007a for discussion of these four epistemological labels). But what is important is a thorough understanding of ontological and methodological suppositions of any such interest/norm distinctions. It is here that the importance of Hay's (2002) 'directional dependence' becomes crucial in the study of normative power. Outside of this volume there have been a number of studies attempting to separate interests and norms in the study of normative power. What becomes clear in most of these attempts is that they are ontologically presupposed by either a belief in the importance of the physical, objective world and the unimportance of the social, subjective world, or they are founded on a belief that it is analytically possible to separate these two human worlds. The problem of such distinctions is briefly raised in the discussion of the difference between 'discursive acceptance' and 'serious belief ' as an 'ontological debate' in Diez and Pace's chapter. Diez has previously addressed this distinction more directly in arguing that 'the point is not that normative power is not strategic, but that MAC/NORM Page-243 9780230_577640_13_cha12
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Ian Manners 243 strategic interests and norms cannot be easily distinguished, and that the assumption of a normative sphere without interests is in itself nonsensical' (Diez 2005: 625). It is here that there are often problematic attempts to portray the study of normative power as separating norms from interests, when the question really involves understanding differing constructions of short-term self-interest, long-term intelligent self-interest, valued beliefs and identity. Similarly problematic is the tendency to compound discourses of 'force for good' with 'normative power', without too much reflection on how these have been differently constructed and by whom (see Barbé as well as subsequent prioritisation of short-term security issues. 9 All these epistemological challenges of empirical evidence, discursive construction and interest/norm distinctions necessitate an interpretive understanding of the social nature of power in the normative power approach, as would be expected of any critical social theory.
The methodology of normative power
Thirdly. Hay (2002: 63-4) sets out how responses to ontological and epistemological questions have methodological consequences in political analysis -'how can we go about acquiring knowledge of that which exists?'. As a third step in the analytical process, there is an additional need to clarify just how we can research the EU in world politics. Although all of the contributions to the volume clearly have an implicit understanding of methodological issues, four of the chapters raise explicit questions of method. Bickerton and Martin both seek stronger and more consistent methodological approaches to analysing and assessing EU external actions, whether involving objective standards or subjective consultation mechanisms in order to judge actions and impacts. Birchfield and Orbie both respond to this call by drawing on the normative power tripartite analytical method in order to interrogate the principles, actions and impact of the EU in development assistance and trade relations. Birchfield suggests that this method may move the normative power approach 'from concept to analytical framework to research programme'.
As an analytical framework the tripartite method makes it possible to analyse the EU's normative power both causally and constitutively. Equally important, the method encourages the use of different forms of critiqueby comparing the EU with other examples at all three stages of the tripartite analysis, as well as comparing claims of principles against the aims of actions and the consequences of impact. In terms of methodological practice and technique, the tripartite method opens up the possibility of using mixed-or Birchfield also suggests that the normative power approach may be evolving beyond an analytical framework towards a 'holistic research programme' in EU studies. As I have discussed previously, the first and most obvious implication for all the sciences in the era of globalisation, is that a holistic approach is really a pre-requisite for our understanding of contemporary Europe . . . Again, the demands of time, funding and publication have meant that most studies of normative power study one empirical case and often one EU principle. Rather than holistic, most studies are therefore focused on single examples with the methodological advantage of singularity but the disadvantage of atomism. Whether the focus of empirical research is in one of the five fields of economy, society, environment, conflict or politics, or on one of the nine principles of sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development or good governance, the methodological risk is that the other four fields, or other eight principles will be overlooked.
Such a tendency to singularity and atomism often means that the political hierarchy and contestation within and between principles is frequently overlooked. While the assertion that there are nine principles at work in the EU is still subject to confirmation, for me there seems little doubt that sustainable peace is the 'prime principle' which leads to its prioritisation over the other eight principles. Similarly, it is the case that liberal principles such as freedom, rule of law and good governance have been in the ascendency over the past decade, despite the strengthening of social principles such as equality, social solidarity and sustainable development in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. Such political contestation between liberal and social principles can only be understood if more than one principle is MAC/NORM Page-245 9780230_577640_13_cha12
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Ian Manners 245 studied through normative power. Such methodological challenges of tripartite method, critique, longitudinal interpretation and holistic analysis necessitate a normative power approach which is holistic, contextual and inclusive, as would be expected of any critical social theory.
10
Normative theory and normative power
Hay's (2002) framework of directional dependence and my three brief perspectives within this framework illustrate the determinist aspects of responses to questions of social science philosophy. Hay usefully summarises his discussion with a final question -'what is the nature and purpose of political science? ' (2002: 64) . In this final section of the conclusion, I return to my opening emphasis on normative theory in order to briefly reflect on the nature and purpose of normative power. Following Cochran (1999), if all theory is normative theory then the challenge is really to reflect on how we judge and justify truth claims about the nature of purpose of normative power in world politics. Clearly this places the emphasis on moving from absolute claims to relative judgements about how we might understand normative power. The immediate temptation would be to move to finding a definition of what 'normative' is, but this is no easy move. Normative political theory is broadly divided between two differing understandings of how 'normative' might be defined using communitarian theory and cosmopolitan theory, both of which are contestable (for a more extended discussion of how these positions relate to EU external actions, see Manners 2010c). As briefly raised in the section on principles in normative power, communitarian theory tends to be seen as involving social values, while cosmopolitan theory tends to be seen as involving concerns for humanity. In the study of normative power, both communitarian and cosmopolitan approaches raise certain concerns. A communitarian emphasis on normative power as promoting European values raises concerns of neo-colonial hegemony. As I have discussed elsewhere, post-colonial theory and concerns for neo-colonial practices must be explicit in attempts to understand how to judge and justify normative power (see Manners 2006c: 184, 2006e: 175, 177). But as Spivak emphasises it is not just Eurocentric communitarian strategies that are problematic, but also the 'culture of capitalism' which evokes a wider critique of neoliberal cosmopolitanism (Spivak 1999: 93; Manners 2006c: 184). A cosmopolitan emphasis on promoting universal values runs the risk of entangling itself in the neoliberal culture of capitalism. As I have also suggested elsewhere, critical social theory and concerns for neoliberal practices must also be explicit in attempts to understand how to judge and justify normative power (Manners 2010c). Calhoun (2003: 111) emphasises the need for cosmopolitanism 'to disentangle itself from neoliberal capitalism' and move towards a more normative heading. In this respect the nature of normative power is more clearly set within the normative political theory of critical social theory and its emphasis on the 
